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On the Merit of Equal Pay: 
Performance Manipulation and Incentive Setting  
BRICE CORGNET, LUDIVINE MARTIN, PEGUY NDODJANG AND ANGELA SUTAN
1
 
Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of 
commonly-used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely 
assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent 
experiments we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation is 
pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of 
incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters 
manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production.  
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1. Introduction  
The economic literature on incentives puts forward that a key aspect of successful organizations is 
their ability to reward each member according to their actual contribution (e.g., Holmström, 1979; 1982; 
Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Doing so, however, requires precise information about individual 
achievements which is, often, not readily accessible to managers. Managers must thus partly rely on 
organizational members‘ reports of their personal contribution and such reports are likely to be biased 
(Prendergast and Topel, 1993). Because presenting oneself in a positive light will typically bring 
monetary benefits, organizational members are likely to engage in ‗window-dressing’ activities so as to 
appear as high contributors. These window-dressing activities consist in making one‘s contribution 
appear deceptively favorable. These activities which have been extensively documented in the finance 
and accounting literatures (see Lakonishok et al., 1991) typically result from hiding relevant pieces of 
information or falsifying documents (Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 1995; Crocker and Morgan, 1998; 
Crocker and Slemrod, 2007; Crocker and Gresik, 2011; Beyer et al., 2014; Roger, 2014). In the 
economics literature on influence costs, window-dressing can also take the form of blatant manipulation 
of managers‘ opinions (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988, 1992; Corgnet and Rodriguez-Lara, 
2013; Powell, 2015). Regardless of the strategy used to distort performance measures, the organization 
will be negatively impacted by these performance manipulation activities as they waste time and distort 
incentive schemes (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; 1992). Performance manipulation will reduce the 
quality of information available to managers thus ultimately weakening the correlation between 
compensation and performance measures (e.g., Holmström, 1979). Performance manipulation is thus 
one possible explanation for the surprising limited strength of incentives in actual labor contracts (e.g., 
Baker et al., 1988; Chiappori and Salanié, 2000).  
Because performance manipulation can only be effective when hidden from management and because 
such activities could be severely punished, it is not surprising that no reliable archival data can be 
obtained (Powell, 2015). This prevents the testing of the main conjectures of the different strands of the 
literature on performance manipulation which highlight the negative effect of performance manipulation 
on organizational performance and the necessity to weaken incentives to prevent such activities. In 
particular, one important insight of the influence costs literature is to show that, in the presence of 














over decisions affecting the distribution of resources. This implies that firms may adopt apparently 
wasteful bureaucratic rules (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) for efficiency concerns (Milgrom, 1988; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1988, 1992; Powell, 2015). For example, firms may avoid discrete bonuses to 
limit influence activities (Fairburn and Malcomson, 2001). Relatedly, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) 
suggested that the extensive use of equal pay may be justified, despite its negative incentive effects, as a 
way to limit influence costs: 
―One clear way to limit the competition for rents is to equalize their distribution across potential 
competitors, or at least limit the possible differentials. (…) The cost of the policy is that informational 
and incentive roles of rewards are muted by closing differentials.‖ (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, page 
274). 
Our aim was to collect data to highlight the tradeoff between the positive incentive effect of pay for 
performance and its damaging effect on promoting window-dressing. To produce data on performance 
manipulation in an organizational context and thus fill the empirical gap in the literature, we created a 
laboratory workplace environment in which workers can, instead of completing a real-effort task, 
engage in a time-consuming activity that will raise their performance metric. Our aim here was to 
develop a computerized environment that would incorporate several features of a real-world workplace 
in the spirit of early real-effort experiments in the economics literature such as Dickinson (1999) and 
van Dijk et al., (2001). 
In our setting, workers have to select a performance manipulation option (displayed on their screen) to 
exaggerate their actual contribution on the real-effort task. Doing so would freeze their screen for a 
duration of 30 seconds during which they could not engage in any activity. The frozen screen aims at 
representing the waste of time typically involved in performance manipulation whether it is related to 
the falsification of documents or to influence activities. As is described by Milgrom (1988, page 43), 
―That time of course is valuable; if it were not wasted in influence activities, it could be used for directly 
productive activities or simply consumed as leisure.‖ 
These influence activities contrast with bribing activities (see e.g., Gneezy et al., 2018) as they do not 
involve any monetary payments thus being difficult to detect. This might explain why influence 
activities are likely to be pervasive within firms whereas bribing activities are not. 
To assess the causal effect of performance manipulation on organizational performance, we consider 














In our first experiment, we consider organizations composed of four workers without a manager. In 
that setting, window-dressing activities were either available or not, and workers‘ compensation was 
either an equal share (25%) of organizational production (equal pay treatments) or a share of 
organizational production which was based on workers‘ observed contribution (observed-performance 
pay treatments). Equal pay treatments thus provide workers with team incentives. When window-
dressing activities were not available, observed contribution was equal to actual contribution in which 
case workers were paid as in an individual piece-rate incentive scheme. When window-dressing 
activities were available, they allowed workers to increase their observed contribution and claim a 
higher share of organizational production.  
We find that window-dressing is much more prevalent under observed-performance pay than under 
equal pay. Under observed-performance pay, almost all workers engaged in performance manipulation 
spending on average 13.8% of their time with a frozen screen compared to 2.0% under equal pay. It 
follows that when window-dressing activities were available organizational production was significantly 
(28.7%) higher under equal pay than under observed-performance pay whereas the opposite was true 
when window-dressing activities were not available. This means that the beneficial effect of equal pay 
on deterring window-dressing activities more than offset its negative incentive effect. The participants to 
Experiment 1 completed a battery of tests when signing up to the lab thus allowing us to study the 
individual determinants of window-dressing activities. Our results provide insights to potential recruiters 
who want to avoid wasteful performance manipulation activities while relying on performance pay to 
motivate workers. We show that more spiteful and more cognitively reflective workers engage more 
often in performance manipulation and produce less in the observed-performance pay treatment in 
which window-dressing is available. The fact that workers who score high on the cognitive reflection 
scale produce less in our setting is particularly striking given that cognitive reflection is commonly 
associated with high performance (e.g., Corgnet et al., 2015e). In addition, cognitive reflection 
significantly and positively correlates with general intelligence which has been shown to be the best 
predictor of work performance (e.g., Schmidt, 2009) as well as diligence on the job (e.g., Corgnet et al., 
2015c). For example, in the observed-performance pay treatment in which window-dressing is not 
available, cognitive reflection relates positively and significantly with production. 
In Experiment 2, we extend Experiment 1 by setting up an organizational environment in which three 
workers are under the supervision of one manager. Our aim was to assess the extent to which managers 














was either an equal share (20%) of organizational production (equal pay treatments) or a share of 
organizational production chosen at the discretion of the manager at the end of each period (discrete pay 
treatments). Regardless of the treatment, the manager always received a fixed share (40%) of 
organizational production. Experiment 2 differs from Experiment 1 as the manager could monitor in 
real-time the evolution of workers‘ performance thus being able to detect excessive window-dressing 
activities which would lead to unlikely high levels of observed performance. Thus, Experiment 2 allows 
us to study monitoring as a possible mechanism to tamper performance manipulation. In addition, in 
Experiment 2 managers could limit the incentives to engage in performance manipulation by 
deliberately paying every worker the same or more generally by making pay less sensitive to 
performance. Not surprisingly, we report less window-dressing activities in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 1. 
Nevertheless, we replicated the main findings of the first experiment regarding the relationship 
between incentive schemes, window-dressing activities and organizational production. In particular, in 
the discrete pay treatments, organizational production was significantly lower when window-dressing 
activities were available than when they were not. We reported no significant differences in 
organizational production between the equal pay treatments. In Experiment 2, we obtained further 
insights on workers‘ window-dressing activities in a context in which these activities could be detected 
by a manager. We find, unlike Experiment 1, that workers mostly engage in minimal window-dressing 
activities exaggerating their performance metric by the minimum possible amount so as not to be 
detected cheating. We find that window-dressing activities led to an increase in workers‘ pay for those 
who exaggerated their production by the minimum possible amount. By contrast, window-dressing 
activities led to a decrease in workers‘ pay for those who exaggerated their production by a larger 
amount.  
Finally, Experiment 2 also allowed us to investigate how managers set incentives when performance 
manipulation is available to workers. We find that managers weakened incentives when window-
dressing activities were available by reducing the link between observed performance and workers‘ pay 
compared to the case in which window-dressing activities were not available. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature and discuss our 
contribution. In Section 3 we develop our conceptual framework and present our hypotheses. In Sections 














2. Related literature 
2.1.  Theory of the firm 
An essential ingredient of any theory of the firm is to provide a convincing explanation for the 
empirical observation that firms heavily rely on low-powered incentive schemes (Gibbons and Roberts, 
2013). By showing that equal pay can improve upon performance pay in the presence of influence 
activities, we provide empirical support for the influence cost theory of the firm. Our work thus belongs 
to a small but growing literature providing causal tests of different theories of the firm.
2
 These works are 
especially crucial given the general imbalance between the many theories of the firm and the few 
empirical tests (e.g., Baker and Holmström, 1995; Prendergast, 2002). Our findings can also be seen as 
providing empirical support for the multitasking theory of the firm (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; 
Dewatripont et al., 2000) which has been growingly popular among organizational economists. Our 
organizational setting can indeed be described as a multitasking problem where workers can either exert 
effort to produce a valuable product or spend time producing a valueless product. We then show that, in 
a context in which the performance metric only consists in the volume of production, workers will 
inefficiently assign their time to the production of valueless products. This activity is what we have 
referred to as performance manipulation or window-dressing. The link between the multitasking and the 
influence costs theories of the firm was already established by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) as well 
as Baker (1992). More specifically, we show that equal pay can alleviate the misallocation of time due 
to multitasking issues thus ultimately leading to greater organizational performance than performance 
pay. 
2.2.  Deception literature 
Starting with the seminal work of Gneezy (2005), deception games have been used extensively to 
study lying behavior. The deception game, inspired from the work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), is a 
two-player setting in which the first player possesses private information about the monetary 
consequences of the action taken by a second player. The first player can send a message to induce the 
second player to take the action that will be most favorable to the first player. Our work extends this 
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 For example, the hold-up theory of the firm developed by Klein et al. (1978) was investigated by Sloof et al. (2004; 2007), the property rights model of 
Hart (1995) was tested by Sonnemans et al. (2001) and the monitoring in teams model of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) was tested by Grosse et al. (2011). 















previous literature by studying performance manipulation in an organizational context. Two crucial 
features characterize our organizational environment. First, unlike deception games, our setting is not a 
zero-sum game as performance manipulation can hurt firm profits as it creates negative externalities by 
wasting time that could be dedicated to organizational duties (Experiments 1 and 2). Second, we 
consider a hierarchical setting in which a manager can monitor and decide upon subordinates‘ payments 
(Experiment 2). Managers can detect and sanction lying behavior thus tampering its negative effect on 
organizational performance. They can also weaken incentives to limit the monetary gains associated 
with misrepresenting one‘s own contribution.  
Our organizational setting may affect prosocial motives (e.g., Gino and Pierce, 2009; Atanasov and 
Dana, 2011; Erat and Gneezy, 2012) or social identity (Shalvi and Leiser, 2013; Utikal and Fischbacher, 
2013) thus impacting dishonest behavior. At the same time, an organizational setting may foster 
dishonest behavior as a few dishonest subjects may rapidly spread unethical behaviors in groups (e.g., 
Carrell et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2013). A priori, it is unclear whether our organizational context would 
lead to widespread dishonesty. However, we observe pervasive lying behavior in our setup confirming 
previous findings in deception games (see Gneezy, 2005) and in individual cheating tasks (Shalvi et al., 
2011a; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Our work not only studies dishonesty in an organizational 
context but it also investigates organizational mechanisms that can deter manipulation activities such as 
performance monitoring and incentive schemes. We find that both intensive monitoring and weak 
incentive schemes can effectively reduce the extent of performance manipulation activities. 
Despite the large number of works studying honest behavior (e.g., Gino, 2015; Jacobsen et al., 2018), 
little is known on the individual determinants of lying behavior (Abeler et al., 2018; Capraro, 2017). In a 
meta-analysis of 50 deception games, Capraro (2017) identifies education level as a main predictor of 
using deceptive strategies. Abeler et al. (2018) combining data from 72 experimental studies show that 
the preference for being honest with a preference for being seen as honest reduce lying behavior. 
Cabrales et al. (2016) also show that more spiteful subjects tend to engage in more deceptive strategies. 
Our work complements these studies by showing that, in our organizational context, both spite and 
cognitive reflection (which correlates with IQ and educational levels, Frederick, 2005) predict lying 
behavior even after controlling for a wealth of individual characteristics including personality traits and 
risk attitudes. 














Related to our work is the experimental literature on cheating and sabotage in tournaments that puts 
forward the negative consequences of relative performance pay (e.g., Konrad, 2000; Preston and 
Szymanski, 2003; Harbring et al., 2007; Kräkel, 2007; Schwieren and Weichselbaumer, 2010; Harbring 
and Irlenbusch, 2011; Balafoutas et al., 2012b; see Chowdhury and Gürtler, 2015 for a review). Our set 
up differs from standard tournament settings which represent competitive environments rather than 
cooperative environments in which organizational members can mutually benefit from the high 
performance of other members. In our experiments, we consider an organizational setting in which 
organizational members‘ efforts determine the total amount of money which is available to reward 
workers. In contrast with tournament incentives which tend to exacerbate competition by clearly 
recognizing one contest winner (e.g., Sheremeta, 2016), our setup considers linear incentive schemes in 
which pay is proportional to performance metrics. It is worth noting that contests may share some of the 
organizational features of our setting as is, for example, the case of Tullock contests in which prizes 
depend on contestants‘ effort (see e.g., Chung, 1996; Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011; see also 
Chowdhury et al., 2014 for an experimental study). The organizational context we envision, unlike 
tournaments, may foster social motives thus leading workers to adopt a cooperative behavior because 
they value organizational norms (e.g., Kandel and Lazear, 1992) as well as care about the well-being of 
other members of the organizations (see e.g., Bandiera et al., 2010). This makes our findings regarding 
the pervasiveness of window-dressing activities especially striking. 
Another important aspect of our work is to assess the effect of incentive schemes on performance 
manipulation. In that respect, the closest paper to ours is the work of Carpenter et al. (2010). In a real-
effort experiment where workers had to prepare letters and envelopes, the authors compared workers‘ 
production in a tournament setting in which performance was assessed by a supervisor with a 
tournament in which performance was partly determined by peers. In their setting, performance 
manipulation followed from peers underreporting others‘ performance to increase their chance of 
winning the tournament prize. This led to a lower level of performance in the tournament with peer 
evaluations than in the tournament setting with supervisor evaluation. They compared workers‘ 
performance under tournament incentives with their performance under piece rates. The authors showed 
that when peers were in charge of reporting performance workers produced more under piece rates than 
under tournament incentives whereas the opposite was true when supervisors were in charge of 
performance reporting. In a recent study, Balafoutas et al. (2017) replicated these findings in a lab in the 














Instead of considering tournament incentives, we built on the literature in performance manipulation 
to assess the extent to which weakening incentives, for example using equal pay, can be beneficial to the 
organization by countervailing window-dressing activities. Our setting is thus one in which performance 
manipulation can arise even in the absence of relative pay. Balafoutas et al. (2017) also considered a 
team incentive setting in which workers could overreport others‘ performance to increase their partners‘ 
pay at the expense of the experimenter. Their setting differs from our experiments as workers do not 
have the opportunity to overreport their own performance at the expense of other workers. Importantly, 
in our experiments window-dressing activities are time consuming thus affecting negatively 
organizational performance and reducing the amount of money to be shared among workers. This is the 
case because we consider window-dressing activities during which workers can exaggerate their 
production and obtain a higher pay without engaging in sabotage. Another major difference between our 
setting and the works of Carpenter et al. (2010) and Balafoutas et al. (2017) is that we consider, in 
Experiment 2, the case in which managers can monitor workers and partly detect performance 
manipulation while having full discretion over workers‘ pay. 
The paper of Charness et al. (2014) also relates to our study as it allows workers to engage in both 
sabotage and window-dressing. It differs from our study as the authors do not assess the effect of 
incentives. Instead, they deliberately chose a flat-wage environment to assess the willingness of workers 
to engage in personally costly sabotage and window-dressing for status-enhancing motives only.  
Our main finding that equal pay outperforms performance pay is thus new to the experimental 
literature. Additionally, Experiment 1 allowed us to establish an individual profile of the typical 
performance manipulator whereas Experiment 2 showed how managers can use monitoring technologies 
to weaken incentives and limit window-dressing activities. Finally, Experiment 2 showed how workers, 
despite tight manager‘s supervision, were able to boost their pay by engaging in subtle performance 
manipulation. Importantly, both experiments show that the positive deterrence effect of equal pay on 
window-dressing more than offsets its negative incentive effect. 
3. Conceptual framework 
Our aim here is to illustrate, using a stylized model, the main implication of the literature on influence 
costs and performance manipulation regarding the detrimental effect of performance pay on 














not aimed at being an exact representation of our experimental framework. In particular, we consider a 
setup in which both effort and window-dressing are binary decisions.  
We consider an organization which is composed of n workers who can either work or shirk as well as 
engage in performance manipulation activities. We will compare organizational performance under two 
contracts: one in which workers are paid based on their observed contribution to the organization 
(observed-performance pay) and one in which all workers are paid an equal share of organizational 
production (equal pay). We also incorporate social motives in our framework thus complementing our 
standard incentive theory toolkit (see e.g., Laffont and Martimort, 2002) with the insights of behavioral 
contract theory (e.g., Rotemberg, 1994; Grund and Sliwka, 2007; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010; Dur 
and Sol, 2010; Bierbrauer et al., 2017). 
3.1. Workers 
Worker   *     + can either exert effort on the work task (    ) or shirk (    ). Working on 
the task implies a cost    . Exerting effort will generate a positive output for the organization 
(    ) with probability   and no output  (    ) with probability    . Exerting no effort always 
leads to no output. We assume that exerting high effort is socially efficient because the expected value 
created by workers when exerting effort is greater than its cost (     ). Instead of working, workers 
can engage in time-consuming window-dressing activities (    ) at a private cost χ or not do so 
(    ). Workers will thus choose whether to exert effort and whether to engage in window-dressing 
activities by maximizing their expected utility subject to the constraint that        . This constraint 
follows from the fact that workers can either exert effort in which case window-dressing activities are 
useless (         ), shirk while engaging in window-dressing activities (         ) or not (   
      ).   
For window-dressing to be appealing, we assume it is less costly than completing the work task so 
that    . In addition to the private cost  , window-dressing activities are socially costly because they 
prevent workers from completing the work task and generate output for the organization (see Milgrom, 
1988). Nonetheless, workers may gain from window-dressing activities as they will positively affect the 
observed measure of output of their effort ( ̂ ). We assume that when worker   engages in window-
dressing, the observed output of shirking will be equal to  ̂    with probability     . It follows that 














In addition to observing  ̂ , the manager knows the total output of the organization. However, because 
the manager cannot break the budget and is thus assumed to redistribute all the organizational output to 
workers, he or she cannot use the total output of the organization to prevent window-dressing activities 
by not paying workers if proof of window-dressing activities is obtained.  
We assume workers to be risk neutral, abstracting away from risk-sharing issues, and focusing our 
attention on the effect of performance manipulation on contract design and organizational performance 
(see Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Gibbons, 2005; Powell, 2015). 
In addition to profit maximization, we consider workers‘ social motives which may include altruism 
(caring about others‘ payoffs), inequality aversion (preferring equal distribution of payoffs) or spite 
(valuing others‘ payoffs negatively) (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Balafoutas et al., 2012a). 
As organizations represent a social context, we expect social motives to play an important role. For 
example, Rotemberg (1994) and Andreoni (1995) show that altruism may alleviate shirking in 
organizations. Because altruistic workers care about other organizational members‘ well-being, they 
may refrain from engaging in window-dressing activities as they ultimately affect others‘ pay negatively.  
By contrast, spiteful workers who are willing to earn more than others even at a cost for themselves or 
for the organization are likely to engage in window-dressing activities to boost their earnings. To study 
the impact of social preferences on window-dressing activities, we assume workers are endowed with 
the following utility function (à la Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) subject to        : 
(1)               (          
   
 
 
)   
 ( ̂ )          
  
 
   
∑   * ( ̂ )   ( ̂ )  +   
   
  
 
   
∑   * ( ̂ )   ( ̂ )  +   
   
 
where  ( ̂ ) stands for the pay of worker i given observed performance  ̂   The parameters   
  and 
  
 
 capture envy and shame when positive. Altruistic individuals are characterized by negative envy and 
shame (  
      
 
  ) whereas spiteful individuals are such that   
    and    
 
   (see e.g., 
Corgnet et al., 2015a). Selfish workers are such that   
      
 
  0. 
3.2. Payment schemes 
We now turn to the payment schemes offered to workers ( ( ̂ )). We consider two types of contracts: 
equal pay and observed-performance pay. Equal pay contracts reward each worker an equal share of 














observed performance so that there is no material incentive or social motive to engage in window-
dressing. Under observed-performance pay contracts are based on the observed contribution of workers 
who are rewarded as follows: 
(2)             ( ̂ )  
  ̂
∑  ̂   
  
where   denotes organizational production (∑     ) and ( ̂  ∑  ̂  ) is the observed contribution of 
worker i. Regardless of the payment scheme, organizational production ( ) is observable by all workers. 
In Appendix A, we formally derive two hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (Performance manipulation and organizational production)  
A) Workers engage in window-dressing activities under observed-performance pay but not 
under equal pay. 
B) Under observed-performance pay, the positive link between workers‘ pay and performance 
is reduced by the presence of window-dressing activities. 
C) Under observed-performance pay, organizational production is lower in the presence of 
window-dressing activities. Under equal pay, organizational production is not affected by 
the presence of window-dressing activities. 
Hypothesis 1C stresses the negative consequences of window-dressing on organizational production in 
line with the influence costs literature (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Gibbons, 2005). It implies that 
equal pay will be an effective solution to thwart window-dressing. An empirical question is to assess 
whether the negative incentive effect of equal pay can be more than offset by its beneficial deterrence 
effect on window-dressing. That is, weaker incentives schemes may be optimal when window-dressing 
activities are available to workers. 
Because window-dressing takes away resources from the firm and negatively affects other 
organizational members, altruistic workers are less likely to engage in such activities whereas spiteful 
workers are more likely to do so (see Appendix A). Because window-dressing activities prevent workers 
from completing the effortful task, the opportunity costs of such activities are the highest for high-skill 
workers. We derive the following hypothesis to capture these implications of our model. 
 














A) More spiteful and less altruistic workers engage in more window-dressing activities. 
B) More skilled workers engage in less window-dressing activities.  
Hypothesis 2A is similar to the conjecture derived in Grund and Sliwka (2007) in the context of 
tournaments in which they show that spiteful workers are more likely to engage in sabotage activities 
whereas compassionate workers are less likely to do so. 
In Experiment 1, we test these hypotheses in a stylized work environment that captures the essential 
features of our model. In Experiment 2, we will consider an environment that extends our stylized model 
allowing for managers to monitor workers and set their pay.  
4. Experiment 1 
4.1. Experimental design and procedures 
The virtual workplace.— We use an environment in which participants can undertake a real-effort task 
while having access to Internet (real-leisure alternative) at any point in time during the experiment 
(Corgnet et al., 2015d; 2015e). The introduction of Internet as the real-leisure alternative is motivated by 
the widespread use of Internet at work (e.g., Malachowski, 2005; Ugrin and Pearson, 2013). An 
appealing feature of Internet as an alternative to the work task is the wide range of activities that can be 
completed online. 
We consider a particularly long and laborious summation task (e.g., Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Eriksson 
et al., 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) so as to ensure that completing the work task required a 
substantial amount of effort. Participants were asked to sum up matrices of 36 numbers comprised 
between 0 and 3 for two periods of ten minutes each. The numbers in each table were generated 
randomly. Participants were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or calculator. This rule amplified the 
level of effort participants had to exert in order to complete tables correctly.  
Each table completed correctly generated 40 cents of individual production while a penalty of 20 cents 
was subtracted from individual production for each incorrect answer. Penalties did not apply when 
individual production was equal to zero so that individual production could not be negative. Individuals 
could thus not sabotage the organization‘s output. Also, individuals could not suffer losses. Penalties 















At any point during the experiment, participants could switch from the work task to the leisure activity 
(browsing the Internet). Each activity was undertaken separately, in a different screen, so that 
participants could not complete tables while being on the Internet. Participants were informed that their 
use of the Internet was strictly confidential. Participants were free to consult their email or visit any web 
page. The Internet browser was embedded in the software so that the experimenter could keep record of 
the exact amount of time participants spent on each activity. At the beginning of each of the two periods, 
participants were randomly assigned to groups of four.  
Payment schemes.—At the end of each period, participants were rewarded a share of the production of 
the organization defined as the sum of the individual production of the four organizational members. In 
the equal pay treatments, each of the four participants was rewarded an equal share of 25% of 
organizational production. In the observed-performance pay treatments, the share of organizational 
production assigned to workers was calculated as   ̂ ∑  ̂    where worker i‘s observed performance (  ̂) 
is the sum of one‘s actual performance and the increase in observed performance obtained from window-
dressing activities. Regardless of the payment scheme, organizational production ( ) was observed by 
all workers. 
Window-dressing activities.—In the window-dressing treatments, participants had access to an additional 
activity which was referred to as boost in the experiment. This activity allowed workers to increase their 
observed level of performance by 40 cents every sixty seconds. This was calibrated so that an average-
ability worker could achieve a higher level of observed performance by simply engaging in window-
dressing activities. If workers only dedicated their time to window-dressing they could achieve a level of 
observed performance of 400 cents whereas average performance in the observed-performance pay 
treatment in which window-dressing was not available was 340 cents. After clicking on a confirmation 
button, the screen of the workers was frozen for 30 seconds. This aimed at representing the cost 
associated with time-consuming window-dressing activities that detract workers from the work task 
(Milgrom, 1988). This 30-second freeze represented 5% of the time available in a given period and 
about half the time an average-ability worker needs to complete one table correctly in the work task.
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Participants could easily keep track of their window-dressing activities in a given period because the 
total amount by which they exaggerated their production was recorded in the history panel at the bottom 
 
3














of their screen. Workers could also keep track of their actual level of production during a given period. 
At the end of each period, participants were informed of their individual pay as well as organizational 
production. 
In the no window-dressing treatments, workers could not exaggerate their production as the boost 
option was disabled. We conducted four treatments as part of a 22 factorial design (see Table 1). The 
complete set of instructions for Experiment 1 is available online (see Appendix D). 
TABLE 1—FACTORIAL DESIGN 
Number of 






Absent 56 (14) [7] 56 (14) [7] 
Present 56 (14) [7] 56 (14) [7] 
Procedures.—Our participant pool consisted of students from a major US University. In total, 224 
participants completed the experiments, divided in 28 sessions. We conducted seven sessions for each 
treatment. In each session, we had a total of 8 participants divided up in two organizations of four 
workers. 
The experiment was computerized and all of the interactions were anonymous. The instructions were 
displayed on participants‘ computer screens. Participants had exactly 20 minutes to read the instructions 
(a 20-minute timer was shown on the laboratory screen).  
All of the subjects who were recruited for this experiment already participated in a prior one-hour 
survey as part of the laboratory policy to collect individual information, including gender, summation 
skills and prosociality, about subjects who are registered in the pool (see Corgnet et al., 2018a). On 
average, participants to our experiment undertook this survey 6 months prior to the current experiment. 
In the ―summation skills‖ task, participants were asked to sum as many five one-digit numbers as they 
could during two minutes. Each correct answer was rewarded 10 cents and the average earnings on this 
task were $1.5. The number of correct answers is what we refer to as ―summation skills‖. Prosociality 
was measured using the elicitation task of Bartling et al. (2009) which was later extended by Corgnet et 
al. (2015a). 
Participants were paid their earnings in cash. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment were 
computed as the sum of the earnings in the 2 periods. Participants earned on average $13.4, including a 
show-up fee of $7. In Experiment 1, the show-up fee corresponds to about 50% of total earnings which 














the same show-up fee of $7 for all experiments regardless of length. In Experiment 2, the show-up fee 
represents slightly less than 30% of total earnings. Experimental sessions lasted on average an hour. 
4.2. Results 
We use regression analyses to assess the statistical significance of our results. All reported p-values 
thus refer to regression results if not stated otherwise. We use panel regressions with random effects 
when assessing individual effects (Hypotheses 1A, 1B and 2) and conduct Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regressions when assessing organizational production (Hypothesis 1C). In each regression, we control 
for summation skills and gender. We thus consider a total of 112 (56 subjects  2 periods) observations 
for each of the treatments when studying individual effects. For organizational production, we consider a 
total of 56 independent observations.  Our results are qualitatively unaffected by using non-parametric 
tests instead of regression analyses. Our methodological choice is to rely exclusively on regression 
results as they allow us to control for differences in ability levels across treatments. We proceed by 
testing each of our hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 1A & 1B: Performance manipulation.—In line with Hypothesis 1A, we report that, under 
observed-performance pay, almost all participants (92.9%) engaged (at least once) in window-dressing 
activities in a given period compared to 33.3% in the case of equal pay (see Table 2). Under observed-
performance pay, workers used window-dressing activities 5.5 times on average in a period compared to 
0.8 times for equal pay. This implies that workers‘ screens were on average frozen for 13.8% of their 
available time under observed-performance pay compared to only 2.0% for equal pay. Thus, participants 
exaggerated their production on average by 170.6% under observed-performance pay compared to 
15.5% under equal pay. 
TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES FOR BOTH THE OBSERVED-PERFORMANCE PAY AND THE 
EQUAL PAY TREATMENTS 
Window-dressing Activities 
 








Proportion of workers who engaged in window-dressing 
































a These p-values are computed using a panel regression with random effects and robust standard errors clustered at the organization level. The reported p-
values correspond to the coefficient of the discrete pay dummy (which takes value one for observed-performance pay treatments and value zero for equal 
pay treatments). We use a gender dummy and summation skills as controls. Similar results are obtained using standard parametric and non-parametric tests. 
In line with Hypothesis 1A, we show that window-dressing activities were pervasive and substantially 
more pronounced under observed-performance pay than under equal pay. Under equal pay, window-
dressing activities are not totally absent, however. Participants may have felt curious to try, at least once, 
the window-dressing option which was available on their screen. This interpretation is consistent with 
the fact that, under equal pay, more than half (51.3%) of those who engaged in window-dressing 
activities only did it once compared to only 8.7% under observed-performance pay. Also, we note that 
the number of times participants engaged in window-dressing decreased from 0.91 in the first period to 
0.69 in the second period under equal pay (Sign rank test, p-value = 0.008) whereas it increased from 
4.8 to 6.1 under observed-performance pay (Sign rank test, p-value = 0.007).
4
  
In line with Hypothesis 1B, we show that the relationship between a worker‘s pay and a worker‘s 
contribution is significantly weaker in the presence of window-dressing activities that in their absence. 
Indeed, in the absence of window-dressing, a $1 increase in one‘s performance increases pay by exactly 
$1 compared to only $0.58 in the presence of window-dressing (see Table B.1 in Appendix B, p-value < 
0.001 for testing the equality of coefficients, using a Wald test). The relationship between performance 
and pay in the presence of window-dressing is, however, significantly higher under observed-
performance pay than under equal pay (p-value < 0.001).
5
 This means that, despite the presence of 
window-dressing activities, observed performance still incorporated some valuable information about 
individual contribution. 
Hypothesis 1C: Organizational production.—Under observed-performance pay, workers dedicated 
13.8% of their time to window-dressing thus leaving only 86.2% of their time available for completing 
the task compared to 98% under equal pay. In the treatments in which window-dressing was not 
available, workers could potentially dedicate all their time to the completion of the task. Because 
workers spent a very limited share of their time to browse the Internet regardless of the treatment, almost 
all the time workers did not spend on window-dressing activities was dedicated to the work task.
6
 We 
thus expect, in line with Hypothesis 1C, that under observed-performance pay organizational production 
 
4
 Similar results are obtained when using panel regression analyses with robust standard errors clustered at the organizational level. 
5
 This is the p-value corresponding to the Wald test that the observed performance coefficient is equal to 0.25. Indeed, by construction, in equal pay 
treatments a $1 increase in one‘s production will increase pay by $0.25. 
6
 Workers spent on average 2.5% of their time on the Internet across all treatments. The overall time spent online by each worker did not vary across 














will be lower when window-dressing activities are available than when they are not. We expect no 
differences in production under equal pay whether window-dressing activities are available or not. Our 
findings support this claim as is illustrated in Figure 1 below. Under observed-performance pay, 
organizational production is 26.3% lower when window-dressing activities are available than when they 
are not (p-value < 0.001). About half of this effect (13.8%) can be attributed to the time wasted in 
window-dressing activities which could have been used to undertake the task. The other half of the 
effect can be attributed to the weakening of incentives in the window-dressing treatment (Hypothesis 
1B). 
Under equal pay, organizational production is not significantly different whether window-dressing 
activities are available or not (p-value = 0.361). 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Box-plots for organizational production across treatments
A
 
Notes: a P-values are computed using OLS regressions with robust standard errors. The reported p-values correspond to the coefficient of the window-
dressing dummy (which takes value one for treatments in which window-dressing is available and value zero otherwise). We control for gender and 
summation skills. These variables are defined as organizational levels averages. 
We also put forward that, in the presence of window-dressing activities, organizational production is 
28.7% higher under equal pay than under observed-performance pay (p-value = 0.003). By contrast, in 
the absence of window-dressing activities, organizational production is slightly, though not significantly, 
higher under observed-performance pay than under equal pay (p-value = 0.322). However, 
organizational production under observed-performance pay and no window-dressing activities is 
significantly greater when compared to both equal pay treatments (p-value = 0.076). 
These results echo an important finding in the influence costs literature according to which limiting 














weaker incentive schemes such as equal pay are likely to be popular in organizations as they lead to 
higher production levels than performance pay when performance manipulation is possible.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Individual profiling of performance manipulators.—We test Hypothesis 2 according to 
which window-dressing activities and workers‘ production are affected by workers‘ social motives and 
skills. To assess social motives, we use the elicitation task of Bartling et al. (2009) (and extended by 
Corgnet et al., 2015a). In particular, we define a prosocial index which measures the extent to which a 
person values others‘ payoffs positively. This index takes values from 0 to 6, where the lowest value 
corresponds to spitefulness (a person who values negatively others‘ payoffs) and the highest possible 
value corresponds to altruism (see Table C.3 in online Appendix C). We obtain similar results when 
using envy and negative envy to assess spitefulness and altruism, respectively. To isolate the respective 
effects of spitefulness and altruism, we define a spiteful dummy (altruism dummy) which takes value 
one whenever a person‘s score is in the bottom quartile (top quartile) of the prosocial index.
7
 Because of 
the highly negative and significant correlation between spitefulness and altruism (ρ = -0.514, p-value < 
0.001), we conduct separate regressions for these two social motives to avoid collinearity issues. In line 
with Hypothesis 2, we report that workers‘ summation skills negatively affect window-dressing (see 
Table 3). In addition, we show that prosociality reduces window-dressing activities whereas it affects 
production positively. Also in line with Hypothesis 2, spitefulness relates positively to window-dressing 
whereas altruism has the opposite effect. Spitefulness also significantly reduces production whereas 
altruism has a positive effect on production (although this effect is not statistically significant, p-value = 
0.365). 
A plausible mechanism by which spite could have fostered window-dressing activities hinges upon 
workers‘ negative reciprocity toward those organizational members who are believed to engage in 
window-dressing. The positive and significant coefficient associated to the variable period in Table 3 
suggests that workers may have started with an optimistic belief regarding the extent of others‘ window-
dressing activities which was then revised upward thus leading to an increase in the magnitude of 
window-dressing activities over time. 
TABLE 3—PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WINDOW-DRESSING (IN SECONDS) AND WORKERS‘ 
PRODUCTION (IN CENTS) IN THE OBSERVED-PERFORMANCE PAY TREATMENT WITH WINDOW-DRESSING 
Dependent Window-dressing Production 
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 Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of our spiteful and altruism dummies such as considering the top and bottom 10% values of the 










































































Gender Dummy  















n = 112 
(14) 
n = 112 
(14) 
n = 112 
(14) 
n = 112 
(14) 
n = 112 
(14) 




 0.115 0.113 0.096 0.420 0.447 0.401 
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses).  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
The one-hour survey completed by the workers participating in Experiment 1 included more 
individual measures than the ones reported in Table 3 such as personality traits, fluid intelligence, risk 
attitudes or cognitive reflection (see online Appendix C for a full description). We assess the potential 
explanatory power of these measures on window-dressing and production in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
We first find that our previous findings regarding the importance of skills and prosocial concerns is 
robust to including additional individual controls.
8
 The only variable that significantly predicts window-
dressing and production in addition to prosociality and skills is cognitive reflection. This result is 
statistically significant at the 1% level despite our analysis controlling for a standard cognitive skills 
measure such as the Raven test score. This suggests that it is cognitive reflection and not standard 
cognitive skills that can explain workers‘ behavior in our environment. Cognitive reflection is a good 
proxy for effortful and deliberative thinking (Toplack et al., 2011; 2014), often referred to as System 2 
(Kahneman, 2011). Our results show that in addition to social motives and ability, a deliberative mindset 
may lead one to engage in more window-dressing activities thus contributing less to organizational 
performance. This result is consistent with Capraro (2016) who shows a negative correlation between 
lying in deception games and cognitive reflection scores. Our findings are consistent with the Truth-
Default-Theory which posits that honesty comes naturally while dishonesty requires deliberation (see 
Verschuere and Shalvi, 2013). Relatedly, Gino and Ariely (2012) found that creative thinkers which 
 
8
 Even though we only present the results using the prosocial index as independent variable, our results are robust to considering spiteful and altruism 















have been found to exhibit higher cognitive reflection scores (see Corgnet et al., 2015a) are more 
inclined to engage in more dishonest behaviors. 
Our results may seem to contrast with recent findings using time pressure manipulations showing that 
dishonest behaviors are intuitive rather than deliberative (e.g., Mead et al., 2009; Gino et al., 2011; 
Shalvi et al., 2012). However, these works make use of individual cheating tasks such as the ‗die-under-
cup task‘ in which participants privately roll a die and report, truthfully or not, the outcome which will 
then determine their pay. We believe our findings show that, in a more complex organizational 
environment than individual cheating tasks, lying may require deliberation. It may also be that trait-level 
deliberation (as measured by cognitive reflection scores) leads to different results than state-level 
deliberation induced by time pressure manipulations (Corgnet et al., 2016). 
The fact that reflective workers produce less in our setting is particularly striking given that cognitive 
reflection has been commonly associated with high performance (e.g., Burks et al., 2015; Corgnet et al., 
2015c). Our findings also challenge the idea that more reflective people are generally willing to engage 
in behaviors that benefit the group (e.g., Corgnet et al., 2015a; Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara, 2015). For 
example, in the observed-performance pay treatment in which window-dressing is not available, 
cognitive reflection relates positively and significantly with production (see Table B.3 in Appendix B). 
To our knowledge, our results are the first to show that the presence of reflective workers may be 
detrimental to organizational production. 
Our analysis of the individual determinants of performance manipulation can be used as guidance for 
recruiters who want to limit wasteful window-dressing activities inside their organizations. 
In the short run, the effectiveness of selecting specific workers to thwart performance manipulation 
can only be limited. In line with our findings, organizations could then rely on equal pay to deter 
performance manipulation. We investigate this possibility in more detail in our second experiment by 
assessing the extent to which managers can reduce performance manipulation by supervising workers 
and adjusting their pay accordingly. To that end, we extend Experiment 1, by considering a workplace 
environment that goes beyond our stylized model and include relevant features of real-world 
organizations such as the presence of a manager who will be able to monitor workers‘ performance as 














5. Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we consider a workplace environment which differs from Experiment 1 as each 
organization of four members will now consist of three employees and one manager. Our aim is to test 
the robustness of our findings in a more complex environment that endows managers full discretion over 
pay (in the discrete pay treatments) while allowing them to monitor employees‘ performance in real 
time. We briefly describe our workplace environment below. In the online Appendix E, we extend the 
model presented in Section 3 to the case in which a manager can set contracts to agents. We derive a 
similar conjecture to Hypothesis 1 which is stated as Hypothesis 1E.   
5.1. Experimental design and procedures 
The virtual workplace.—We use the same virtual workplace platform as in Experiment 1. The main 
difference is that organizations of four members now include one manager and three employees. At the 
beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of these two roles. Unlike 
Experiment 1, participants kept the same role and the same partners for the whole duration of the 
experiment which consisted of five periods of 10 minutes. This was done so that managers could adjust 
their pay policy over time based on their observation of employees‘ behavior. A longer experiment was 
also considered to assess the persistence of the effects uncovered in Experiment 1. The spirit of the 
design of Experiment 2 was to extend Experiment 1 so as to test of the effect of payment schemes on the 
magnitude of window-dressing activities in a work environment which more closely mimics actual 
workplaces. 
The manager.—In addition to working on the task and browsing the Internet, the manager could observe 
the value of individual production (in cents) of each of the three employees at any time during a period 
by accessing a separate window with a monitoring screen. At the end of each period, the manager 
received a monitoring summary which indicated the observed individual production of each of the 
employees the last time the principal accessed the monitoring screen. As a result, managers could easily 
obtain the maximum amount of information regarding employees‘ period production by accessing the 
monitoring screen in the very last seconds of each period. At the end of each period, the manager as well 















Payment schemes.—At the end of each of the five periods, employees and managers were rewarded a 
share of the production of the organization. Regardless of the treatment, the manager was always 
rewarded 40% of organizational production. In the equal pay treatments, each of the three employees 
was rewarded an equal share of 20% of organizational production. In the discrete pay treatments, the 
manager chose how to allocate the remaining 60% of organizational production to the three employees. 
Regardless of the payment scheme, organizational production (Y) was observed by all workers. 
Window-dressing activities.—As in Experiment 1, employees had access to an additional activity which 
was referred to as boost in the window-dressing treatments. Unlike Experiment 1, employees were given 
full discretion on the frequency at which and on the amount by which they wanted to exaggerate their 
observed performance. 
At the end of each period, the manager knew the actual production of the organization. Thus, in cases 
in which employees engaged in window-dressing activities, the actual production of the organization 
differed from the sum of the observed individual productions in the manager‘s monitoring summary. In 
addition, individual window-dressing activities could have been detected by the manager if an employee 
chose a boost amount which was not a multiple of 30. This is the case because each correct table 
generated 60 cents while an incorrect answer implied a 30-cent penalty. The value of a correct table and 
the penalty associated to an incorrect one differs from Experiment 1 simply because of the need to 
calibrate participants‘ earnings so that they would on average be equal to the average hourly pay offered 
in the lab. Thus, choosing a boost amount which was not a multiple of 30 would have indicated to the 
manager that the employee had engaged in window-dressing activities. An employee who decides to 
engage in excessively large or frequent window-dressing activities may also be detected by the manager 
monitoring the worker‘s performance.  
In the no window-dressing treatments, performance manipulation was not possible as the boost option 
was disabled. As in Experiment 1, we conducted four treatments as part of a 22 factorial design (see 
Table B.5). The complete set of instructions for Experiment 1 is available online (see Appendix D). 
Procedures.—Procedures were similar to Experiment 1. Upon arrival at the lab, ―summation skills‖ were 
assessed using the same two-minute task as for the one-hour survey used in Experiment 1. Participants 
earned on average $25.1, including a show-up fee of $7. Experimental sessions lasted on average two 



















In this extended setting, we aim at testing Hypothesis 1A regarding the prevalence of window-dressing 
activities when managers can pay employees at their own discretion. We also want to assess the 
weakening of incentives when window-dressing is available (Hypothesis 1B). The weakening of 
incentives in the context in which managers have full discretion over workers‘ pay will, unlike 
Experiment 1, crucially depends on managers‘ pay decisions. We also test Hypothesis 1C regarding the 
negative effect of window-dressing activities on organizational production when managers have full 
discretion over pay. 
Hypothesis 1A & 1B: Performance manipulation.—In line with Experiment 1, window-dressing 
activities are pervasive and significantly more pronounced under discrete pay than under equal pay (see 
Table 4). As is the case for Experiment 1, workers spent a very limited share of their time browsing the 




TABLE 4—SUMMARY OF WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES 
FOR BOTH THE DISCRETE PAY AND THE EQUAL PAY TREATMENTS 
Window-dressing activities 
 
Payment Scheme  
Discrete Pay Equal Pay p-value
 a
 
Proportion of workers who engaged in window-

























Notes: Standard deviations (in parentheses). 
a Consistently with the rest of the results section, these p-values are computed using a panel regression with random effects and robust standard errors 
clustered at the organization levels. The reported p-values correspond to the coefficient of the discrete pay dummy (which takes value one for discrete pay 
treatments and value zero for equal pay treatments). We use a gender dummy and summation skills as controls. Similar results are obtained using standard 
parametric and non-parametric tests. 
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 Because of funding and timing constraints, not all subjects in the pool of subjects where the experiment was conducted completed the one-hour survey. 
10
 The overall time spent online by each worker did not vary across treatments as the six pairwise comparisons across treatments produced p-values 














Under equal pay, window-dressing activities occupied employees for 3.1% of the time which is 
similar to the time dedicated by employees to window-dressing in Experiment 1 (2.0%). However, the 
percentage of time spent on window-dressing activities under discrete pay is substantially lower (4.6%) 
than the time dedicated to these activities in the observed-performance pay treatment in Experiment 1 
(4.6% vs 13.8%). Also, only about half of the employees engaged in window-dressing activities in a 
given period under discrete pay compared to 92.9% in Experiment 1 in the observed-performance pay 
treatment. This suggests that the benefits of window-dressing activities were more limited in the 
presence of a supervising manager. This is likely due to the fact that window-dressing activities may be 
detected in Experiment 2 if they are undertaken too intensively. 
To investigate that possibility in more detail, we classify window-dressing activities as either 
detectable or undetectable. Because each correct table generated 60 cents while an incorrect answer 
implied a 30-cent penalty, an employee‘s production level was necessarily a multiple of 30. An 
employee who decided to exaggerate his or her production by an amount which was not a multiple of 30 
was thus engaging in detectable window-dressing activities. An employee who exaggerated his or her 
production by an excessively large amount could also be seen as engaging in detectable window-
dressing activities. 
Window-dressing activities which are very unlikely to be detected by the manager are such that 
employees exaggerated their period production by the smallest possible amounts (i.e., one or two correct 
tables).
11
 These amounts were actually the ones which were most likely to be chosen by workers. As is 
shown in Figure 2, the large majority (68.2%) of window-dressing activities involved exaggerating one‘s 
own production by two tables or less. Employees who exaggerated their production by two tables or less 
increased their observed production by 26.6% on average. By contrast, employees who exaggerated their 
production by at least three tables increased their observed production by 131.3% on average. 
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FIGURE 2. Histogram for the amount (expressed as the number of correct tables) by which a worker 
decided to exaggerate his or her observed production in a given period. experiment 2 is represented on the 
left panel and experiment 1 on the right panel. 
 
The fact that most employees decided to exaggerate their production by the smallest possible amount 
is in line with the literature on cheating in individual tasks according to which people are willing to 
avoid major lies (e.g., Shalvi et al., 2011b). In our case, however, the main motive is to avoid detection 
of window-dressing activities by the manager. Indeed, when a manager is not present and cheating 
cannot be detected, then only a minority of window-dressing activities (26.9%) consisted in 
exaggerating one‘s own production by two tables or less (see right panel for Experiment 1 in Figure 2). 
Next, we attempt to understand employees‘ caution to engage in window-dressing activities in 
Experiment 2 by analyzing the relationship between window-dressing activities and employees‘ pay. In 
Table 5, we regress an employee‘s pay on an independent variable that aims at capturing undetectable 
window-dressing activities (“Two tables or less” window-dressing dummy). This dummy variable takes 
value one whenever an employee exaggerates his or her production in a given period by a total amount 
either equal to 30¢, 60¢, 90¢ or 120¢ (that is, the monetary value of at most two correct tables, see 
column [1] in Table 5). In columns [2] and [3], we also include in our regression analysis a dummy 
variable that takes value one whenever an employee exaggerated his or her production by three tables or 
more (“Three tables or more” window-dressing dummy). Finally, we control for the actual contribution 
of the employee as it is supposedly an important determinant of pay even when window-dressing 
activities are available. We also control for employees‘ ability on the task using the ―summation skills‖ 
measure and gender. 














We report a positive and significant effect of undetectable window-dressing activities on employees‘ 
pay (see “Two tables or less” window-dressing dummy in columns [1] and [2] of Table 5). By contrast, 
we do not observe such positive effect of window-dressing activities when considering only those 
window-dressing activities by which employees exaggerated their production by three tables or more 
(see “Three tables or more” window-dressing dummy in columns [2] and [3] in Table 5). Our regression 
results thus suggest that an employee could increase his or her discrete pay by engaging in window-
dressing activities as long as such activities were undetectable. Interestingly, summation skills appear to 
have no effect on employee‘s pay, regardless of the specification of the regression. That is, in the 
presence of window-dressing activities, ability on the task does not seem to be an important driver of 
employees‘ performance and of their subsequent pay. In Table B.6 in Appendix B, we provide 
additional analyses regarding the effect of window-dressing activities on pay. These findings show the 
robustness of the positive effect of undetectable window-dressing activities on pay. The effectiveness of 
window-dressing activities in boosting pay echoes the work of Robin et al. (2014). In their experimental 
setting, workers‘ pay was determined by managers after observing workers‘ performance and workers‘ 
opinions on non-work-related issues. The authors show that workers were able to positively influence 
their pay by expressing opinions which were similar to their bosses. 
TABLE 5—PANEL REGRESSIONS ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF UNDETECTABLE WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES ON 
DISCRETE PAY FOR THE TREATMENT WITH WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES AND DISCRETE PAY 
Dependent variable Discrete pay (in %) 

















































n = 240 (16) 
0.254 
n = 240 (16) 
0.253 
n = 240 (16) 
0.232 
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses). 















In sum, the fact that window-dressing activities are less prevalent in Experiment 2 compared to 
Experiment 1 is likely to be due to the presence of the manager who can detect and then punish 
excessive manipulation attempts. It is interesting to note that monitoring, even in the absence of possible 
punishments associated to lower pay, might inflict moral costs on workers thus deterring them from 
engaging in manipulation attempts (see Gneezy et al., 2018; Abeler et al., 2018). Another reason why 
window-dressing activities may be limited can also be linked to the manager‘s ability to weaken 
incentives thus rendering performance manipulation ineffective. To test the weakening of incentives in 
the presence of window-dressing activities (Hypothesis 1B), we proceed, as for Experiment 1, by 
assessing the extent to which performance explains employees‘ pay in the two discrete pay treatments. 
We find that when window-dressing activities are available, a $1 increase in one‘s performance 
increases one‘s pay by $0.39 (when window-dressing consists of two tables or less) compared to $0.58 
in the absence of window-dressing. This difference is statistically significant (see Table B.7 in the 
Appendix B, p-value = 0.028). As is the case for Experiment 1, the relationship between performance 
and pay in the presence of window-dressing is significantly higher under discrete pay than under equal 
pay whether window-dressing is present or not (p-values < 0.001).
12
 This means managers rely on 
employees‘ observed performance to determine their pay even when window-dressing pervasively 
distorts the informational content of the performance metric. Managers thus seem reluctant to rely 
exclusively on equal pay to deter performance manipulation. This could be because managers 
intrinsically value their decision rights over the pay of their subordinates (e.g., McClelland, 1975; 
Bartling et al., 2014) or because they believe employees value payment schemes that are at least partly 
based on individual performance metrics (e.g., Ogbonnaya et al., 2017). 
At the same time, the results in Table 5 show that managers discounted observed performance 
whenever employees exaggerated their performance by a large amount (see negative coefficient for the 
―Three tables or more‖ window-dressing dummy). Finally, managers were more likely to allocate 
organizational production equally across employees in the presence of window-dressing (22.5% of the 
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 These p-values correspond to the Wald tests that the coefficient associated to performance (see Table B.7) is equal to 0.25. Indeed, by construction, in 


















Hypothesis 1C: Organizational production.—We find support for Hypothesis 1C by showing that, under 
discrete pay, the average production of the organization (per period) was on average 14.6% lower in the 
window-dressing treatment ($16.25) compared to the no window-dressing treatment ($18.62) (see Figure 
3 below). 
 
FIGURE 3. Box-plots for organizational production (per period, in cents) across treatmentsa 
Notes: a P-values are computed using OLS regressions with robust standard errors. The reported p-values correspond to the coefficient of the window-
dressing dummy (which takes value one for treatments in which window-dressing is available and value zero otherwise). We use controls for gender and 
summation skills as controls. These variables are defined as organizational levels averages. 
As for Experiment 1 and in line with Hypothesis 1C, we find no significant differences between equal 
pay treatments in terms of organizational production. In line with Experiment 1, we also find that 
organizational production was 14.0% greater under discrete pay than under equal pay in the absence of 
window-dressing activities (p-value = 0.076). By contrast, organizational production was 8.6% lower 
under discrete pay than under equal pay in the presence of window-dressing (although the difference is 
not statistically significant, p-value = 0.222). 
Our findings thus support the recommendation derived from the influence costs literature to give away 
managerial discretion by setting an equal pay to all workers. 
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 This is the p-value associated to the coefficient for the dummy of the discrete pay treatment with window-dressing in a probit panel regression with 
random effects and robust standard errors in which the dependent variable takes value 1 if a manager allocates organizational production equally across 















We provided the first causal test of the negative effect of performance manipulation activities in an 
organizational context. We showed that weakening incentives and limiting managerial discretion may be 
optimal to deter performance manipulation. In particular, equal pay seemed to substantially reduce 
window-dressing activities thus leading to higher organizational production than pay for performance. 
This was the case because the positive effect of equal pay on deterring window-dressing activities more 
than offset its negative incentive effect. This echoes the theoretical literature on tournaments showing 
that sabotage can be alleviated by reducing the gap between winning and losing prizes thus reducing the 
strength of incentives (see e.g., Lazear, 1989). This prediction has been supported in a series of 
laboratory experiments (Harbring and Irlenbush, 2004; 2005; 2011; Vandergrift and Yavas, 2010). The 
experimental literature in tournaments also suggests that giving workers the possibility to retaliate when 
observing that others engage in window-dressing activities might deter such manipulation attempts 
(Harbring et al., 2007; Vandergrift and Yavas, 2010). 
In addition, our second experiment showed that performance manipulation could be reduced by 
putting a manager in charge of both supervising and compensating workers. This was the case because, 
thanks to their supervision technology, managers seemed to be able to detect and thus penalize excessive 
performance manipulation. Furthermore, managers were able, thanks to their discretion over workers‘ 
pay, to lessen the link between performance and pay thus limiting workers‘ incentives to engage in 
performance manipulation. 
Even when managers were endowed with a supervision technology and full discretion over workers‘ 
pay, organizational production was still negatively affected by the availability of window-dressing 
activities. This was the case because curbing window-dressing activities led managers to weaken 
incentives.  
Managers may, however, not be willing to rely on equal pay to deter performance manipulation. This 
would be the case if managers intrinsically valued their decision rights (e.g., McClelland, 1975; Bartling 
et al., 2014). This implies that, in the absence of inflexible bureaucratic rules, managers may voluntarily 
leave the door open to manipulative attempts. In that case, it might be helpful to physically separate 
employees and managers to limit influence activities. This separation might motivate the existence of 
rigid hierarchical structures (see Lazear, 1989). This suggests future avenues of research assessing the 
causal impact of multi-layer hierarchies and different structures of communication on the extent of 














An appealing alternative strategy to eradicate performance manipulation could be based on recruiting 
workers who are less inclined to engage in influence activities. We show that such workers cannot be 
identified using standard recruiting techniques based on personality traits and fluid intelligence. Instead, 
we identify performance manipulators as being spiteful and reflective. 
Because current recruiting methods emphasize fluid intelligence and because cognitive reflection 
correlates significantly and positively with fluid intelligence, firms may be inadvertently recruiting 
potential manipulators in large numbers. This selection effect suggests window-dressing activities are 
likely to be pervasive in actual firms. Thus, extending our analysis to profiling performance 
manipulators within actual firms would be a crucial step in the research agenda.  
 
Appendix A: Performance manipulation model 
Our model can be represented as a game with a pure strategy space represented as follows,    
*     + where     *   +     *   + and        . 
In Table A.1, we derive the optimal effort and window-dressing decisions for     in terms of 
workers‘ cost levels across social motives and payment schemes. We consider efficient equilibria in 
which all workers exert effort. 
TABLE A.1—EFFICIENT EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS ACROSS WORKERS‘ SOCIAL MOTIVES WHEN     
Payment 
scheme 
Equal pay Observed-performance pay 
Social motive  
Selfish   
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We now consider window-dressing equilibria. In our setting, these equilibria can only occur when 
some workers exert effort whereas others do not. For this to happen, we consider that the population of 
workers is divided into two types of workers. Low-ability workers are such that:         and high-
ability workers are such that:        and      denotes the number of high-ability workers in the 















TABLE A.2—WINDOW-DRESSING EQUILIBRIA CONDITIONS ACROSS WORKERS‘ ABILITY TYPES 
Payment 
scheme 
Equal pay Observed-performance pay 
Social motive  
Selfish   
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To derive Hypothesis 1A, we note that window-dressing equilibria may arise under observed-
performance pay whereas they do not under equal-pay (see Table A.2). Under observed-performance 
pay, it follows that in the presence of window-dressing some workers (see low-ability workers in Table 
A.2) could be rewarded although they have not produced output (    ). This does not occur in the 
absence of window-dressing activities in which case workers are always paid according to their actual 
contribution to the work task. Hypothesis 1B thus follows.  
Hypothesis 1C follows directly from the fact that ensuring workers‘ effort in equilibrium under equal 
pay is unaffected by the presence of window-dressing activities (  
 
 
) whereas under observed-
performance pay the range of cost of effort values that implements the efficient equilibrium is smaller in 
the absence of window-dressing activities (   ) than in its presence. Indeed, in the presence of 
window-dressing activities the upper bound on the worker‘s cost of effort ensuring the existence of an 
efficient equilibrium is less than   (see right column in Table A.2). 
Hypothesis 2A follows from the fact that under observed-performance pay the conditions for low-
ability workers to engage in window-dressing in equilibrium are less likely for large values of   
  (see 
Table A.2). This is the case because an increase in   














the cost of effort of high-ability (low-ability) workers that ensures a window-dressing equilibrium exists. 
The intuition is that envious [altruistic] workers (  
   ) [  
   ] are less [more] likely to deviate from 
the window-dressing equilibrium because it would most likely lead them to earn lower payoff than their 
counterparts. 
Note that for     , shame (  
 
) also affects the conditions for the existence of a window-dressing 
equilibrium. We do not derive any conjecture on shame because it is found to matter in only specific 
circumstances. In particular, a shameful low-ability worker might be less likely to deviate from the 
window-dressing equilibrium by exerting effort in the case in which this effort generates output (with 
probability   ) whereas other low-ability workers‘ window-dressing attempts fail (with probability 
    ).  
In line with Hypothesis 2B, it is also the case that window-dressing activities can only arise in 
equilibrium when low-ability workers engage in them while high-ability workers decide to work on the 
task. By contrast, it cannot be the case in equilibrium that high-ability workers engage in window-
dressing while low-ability workers do not. The intuition is that deviating from the window-dressing 
equilibrium is less costly for high-ability workers than for low-ability workers because they are more 
likely to secure a payment when exerting effort in the absence of window-dressing. 
 
Appendix B: Additional tables and analyses 
EXPERIMENT 1 
TABLE B.1—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WORKERS‘ PAY (IN CENTS) 
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses). 




Workers‘ pay (per period) in cents 






























TABLE B.2—PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WINDOW-DRESSING (IN SECONDS) AND WORKERS‘ 
PRODUCTION (IN CENTS) AS A FUNCTION OF A LARGE SET OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 











Individual characteristics   
Demographics   




































Personality & social motives   
Big five personality traits ns 
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n = 112 (28) 
0.317 
n = 112 (28) 
0.546 
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
a Conscientiousness explains production significantly (p-value = 0.021) whereas the other four traits are not related to production. 
b Results are not affected by restricting our analysis to only the 46 (out of 56) participants who did not switch back and forth between the safer and the riskier 

























TABLE B.3—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WORKERS‘ PRODUCTION (IN CENTS) AND 
WINDOW-DRESSING (IN SECONDS) AND A LARGE SET OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 
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Demographics     
































































Personality & social motives     






































Observations (organizations) n = 112 (28) n = 112 (28) n = 112 (28) n = 112 (28) 
R² 0.312 0.312 0.560 0.535 
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
a Conscientiousness explains production significantly (p-value = 0.051) whereas the other four traits are not related to production. 
b Conscientiousness explains production significantly (p-value = 0.031) whereas the other four traits are not related to production. 
c Results are not affected by restricting our analysis to only the 46 (out of 56) participants who did not switch back and forth between the safer and the riskier 





















TABLE B.4—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WORKERS‘ PRODUCTION (IN CENTS) AND A 
LARGE SET OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
a Results are not affected by restricting our analysis to only the 46 (out of 56) participants who did not switch back and forth between the safer and the riskier 





















Individual characteristics   
Demographics   




































Personality & social motives 
Big five personality traits ns ns 




















n = 112 (28) 
0.425 
















TABLE B.5—FACTORIAL DESIGN 
Number of 
participants (organizations) [sessions] 
Payment Scheme 
Discrete Pay Equal Pay 
Window-dressing 
Activities 
Absent 60 (15) [5] 60 (15) [5] 
Present 64 (16) [5] 64 (16) [5] 
 
In Table B.6, we provide additional robustness checks regarding the positive effect of detectable 
window-dressing activities on agent pay. We define as detectable window-dressing activities those for 
which: 
[1] Agents boosted their production by an amount which was not a multiple of 30. 
[2] Agents boosted their production by an excessive amount. 
 In particular, we define as excessive those window-dressing activities that led agents‘ production (as 
observed by the principal) to be in the top 35% (25%) [20%] {10%} of agents‘ production levels in the 
discrete pay treatment without influence: 540¢ (600¢) [660¢] {720¢}. These thresholds imply that the 
respective proportions of undetectable window-dressing activities are 22.2%, 26.2%, 30.0% and 33.3%.  
Our regression results (see Table B.6) are consistent with Table 5 showing that agents can increase 




























TABLE B.6—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSIONS ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF UNDETECTABLE WINDOW-DRESSING 
ACTIVITIES ON DISCRETE PAY FOR THE TREATMENT WITH WINDOW-DRESSING ACTIVITIES AND DISCRETE PAY 
Dependent variable Workers‘ pay (per period) in cents 









































































n = 240 (16) 
0.255 
n = 240 (16) 
0.259 
n = 240 (16) 
0.242 
n = 240 (16) 
0.243 
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level; 
  




TABLE B.7—LINEAR PANEL REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WORKERS‘ PAY (IN CENTS) 










































n = 225 (45) 
0.668 
n = 240 (48) 
0.376 
n = 465 (93) 
0.549 
Notes: Estimation output using robust standard errors clustered at the organization level (in parentheses). 
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